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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The antitrust laws are concerned with “the protection 
of competition, not competitors.”1  Eisai complains that the 
conduct of Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, and Sanofi U.S. 
Services, Inc., (Sanofi) jointly and severally harmed 
competition in the market for anticoagulant drugs by 
preventing hospitals from replacing Lovenox, one of Sanofi’s 
drugs, with competing drugs.  The facts, however, do not bear 
out Eisai’s characterization of market events.  For the reasons 
stated below, we conclude that what Eisai calls “payoffs” 
                                              
1 Brown Shoe Co v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
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were, in reality, discounts offered by Sanofi to its customers; 
what Eisai calls “agreements with hospitals to block access” 
were, in reality, provisions proscribing customers from 
favoring competing drugs over Lovenox; what Eisai calls “a 
campaign of ‘fear, uncertainty, and doubt’” was, in reality, 
Sanofi’s marketing of Lovenox.  Analyzing Eisai’s claims 
under the rule of reason, we find no evidence that Sanofi’s 
actions caused broad harm to the competitive nature of the 
anticoagulant market.  To the extent that Sanofi’s conduct 
caused damage to its competitors, that is not a harm for which 
Congress has prescribed a remedy.  We will therefore affirm 
the order of the District Court, granting summary judgment in 
favor of Sanofi.    
 
I. 
A. 
 Lovenox is an anticoagulant drug used in the treatment 
and prevention of deep vein thrombosis (DVT), a condition in 
which blood clots develop in a person’s veins.  Lovenox 
belongs to a category of injectable, anticoagulant drugs 
known as low molecular weight heparin (LMWH).  Lovenox 
was the first LMWH approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration and has been sold by Sanofi in the United 
States since 1993.  Lovenox has at least seven FDA-approved 
uses (known as indications), including the treatment of certain 
severe forms of heart attack.   
 
 Fragmin is a competing injectable LMWH, which 
Pfizer, Inc., initially sold only abroad.  In September 2005, 
Pfizer sold Eisai an exclusive license to market, sell, and 
distribute Fragmin in the United States.  Fragmin has five 
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FDA-approved indications, some of which overlap Lovenox’s 
indications. Fragmin is also indicated to reduce the 
reoccurrence of symptomatic venous thromboembolism in 
cancer patients, while Lovenox is not.  Lovenox, however, is 
indicated for treating certain more severe forms of heart 
attack, an indication that Fragmin does not have.  
 
 The relevant product market also consists of two other 
injectable anticoagulant drugs, Innohep and Arixtra.  Innohep, 
a LMWH, was manufactured and sold by LEO Pharma Inc. in 
the United States from 2000 to 2011.  Arixtra is an injectable 
anticoagulant approved by the FDA in 2001 and sold in the 
United States by GlaxoSmithKline from 2005 to 2010.  While 
not a LMWH, Arixtra is clinically comparable to LMWHs in 
its treatment of DVT.   
 
 Relevant to Eisai’s claims is the market for Lovenox, 
Fragmin, Innohep, and Arixtra in the United States from 
September 27, 2005 (when Eisai was able to begin selling 
Fragmin) until July 25, 2010 (when Sanofi ended certain 
marketing practices after a generic entered the market).  
During that time, Lovenox had the most indications of the 
four drugs, the largest sales force, and maintained a market 
share of 81.5% to 92.3%. Fragmin had the second largest 
market share at 4.3% to 8.2%.  
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      B. 
 Eisai’s antitrust claims relate to Sanofi’s marketing of 
Lovenox to U.S. hospitals.  Most hospitals are members of 
group purchasing organizations (GPOs), which negotiate drug 
contracts and discounts from pharmaceutical companies on 
behalf of their members.  From September 2005 until July 
2010, Sanofi offered GPOs the “Lovenox Acute Contract 
Value Program” (Program), featuring a contractual offer to 
sell Lovenox on certain terms and conditions.  Eisai’s 
allegations of anticompetitive conduct relate to three elements 
of this program:  (1) market-share and volume discounts, (2) a 
restrictive formulary access clause, and (3) aggressive sales 
tactics used to market the program.  
 
 (1)  Under the terms of the Program, hospitals received 
price discounts based on the volume of Lovenox they 
purchased and their market-share calculation tied to their 
purchases of the four anticoagulant drugs.2  The Program 
generally treated a GPO’s members as individual customers 
when determining the volume and market share.  When a 
hospital’s purchases of Lovenox were below 75% of its total 
purchases of LMWHs, it received a flat 1% discount 
regardless of the volume of Lovenox purchased.  But when a 
hospital increased its market share above that threshold, it 
would receive an increasingly higher discount based on a 
combination of the volume purchased and the market share.  
For example, in 2008, the discount ranged from 9% to 30% of 
the wholesale price.  Additionally, if certain criteria were met, 
                                              
2 Specifically, the market share was defined as the rolling four 
months of Lovenox units purchased by the hospital divided 
by the rolling four months of all units purchased within the 
market for Lovenox, Fragmin, Arixtra, and Innohep. 
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a multi-hospital system could have the hospitals’ volumes and 
market shares calculated as one entity.  For a multi-hospital 
system, the discount started at 15% for a market share 
meeting the threshold, and increased to 30%.  
 
 Although this discount structure motivated GPOs to 
purchase more Lovenox, they were not contractually 
obligated to do so.  The consequence of not obtaining 75% 
market share was that a customer would receive only the 1% 
discount.  If a customer chose to terminate the contract, it was 
required to give thirty days’ notice and could still purchase 
Lovenox “off contract” at the wholesale price.  
 
 (2)  The Program also included a formulary access 
clause that limited a hospital’s ability to give certain drugs 
priority status on its formulary.  Generally, a hospital 
maintains a formulary, a list of medications approved for use 
in the hospital based on factors such as a drug’s cost, safety, 
and efficacy.  The formulary access clause in the Lovenox 
contract required customers to provide Lovenox with 
unrestricted formulary access for all FDA-approved Lovenox 
indications so that the availability of Lovenox was not more 
restricted or limited than the availability of Fragmin, Innohep, 
or Arixtra.  Hospitals were also forbidden by the contract to 
adopt any restrictions or limitations on marketing or 
promotional programs for Lovenox.  In essence, the contract 
did not prohibit members from putting other anticoagulant 
drugs on their formularies, but did prohibit them from 
favoring those drugs over Lovenox.  Noncompliance with the 
contract did not limit a customer’s access to Lovenox; it 
merely caused a customer’s discount to drop to the 1% base 
level.   
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 (3)  According to Eisai, Sanofi further engaged in a 
long-term campaign to discredit Fragmin by spreading “fear, 
uncertainty and doubt” about its safety and efficacy.  Eisai 
asserts that the so-called “FUD” campaign consisted of the 
following conduct:  Sanofi paid doctors to publish articles 
attacking Fragmin on false grounds, without properly 
disclosing such payments, and distributed those articles 
broadly; Sanofi paid doctors to present educational programs 
regarding the medical and legal risks of switching from 
Lovenox, casting doubt on Fragmin’s effectiveness and 
promoting a belief that Fragmin use would expose hospitals 
to malpractice liability; Sanofi’s representatives claimed that 
Lovenox was superior to other drugs, in violation of FDA 
regulations; and Sanofi promoted Lovenox for non-indicated 
cancer-related uses, also in violation of FDA regulations.  
 
C. 
 Eisai commenced this action on August 18, 2008, in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 
asserting (1) willful and unlawful monopolization and 
attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act;3 (2) de facto exclusive dealing in violation of 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act;4 (3) an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act;5 and (4) 
violations of the New Jersey Antitrust Act.6  Sanofi moved to 
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for being 
untimely under the applicable statute of limitations.  After a 
                                              
3 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
4 15 U.S.C. § 14. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
6 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:9-3 and 56:9-4. 
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hearing, the District Court denied the motion and referred the 
case to a magistrate judge for further proceedings. 
 
 The parties then engaged in extensive discovery.  On 
one particularly contentious discovery issue, Eisai moved to 
compel discovery of deposition transcripts from a 2003 
antitrust lawsuit brought by Organon Sanofi-Synthelabo 
(OSS) against Aventis Pharmaceuticals (Sanofi’s 
predecessor) relating to a contractual offer similar to the 
terms of the Lovenox Program.  On February 27, 2012, the 
Magistrate Judge denied Eisai’s motion on the basis that the 
2003 transcripts were irrelevant to the current action and 
unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and 
because the burden or expense of the discovery outweighed 
its likely benefit.  The District Court affirmed the order.   
 
 Both parties subsequently moved for summary 
judgment.  Eisai relied largely on an expert report by 
Professor Einer Elhauge, who determined that customers 
occupying a certain spectrum of market share would not save 
money by partially switching to a rival drug, even if the rival 
drug was cheaper than Lovenox.  According to Professor 
Elhauge, the Lovenox Program restricted rival sales by 
bundling each customer’s contestable demand for Lovenox 
(the units that the customer is willing to switch to rival 
products) with the customer’s incontestable demand for 
Lovenox (the units that the customer is less willing to switch 
to rival products).  The incontestable demand for Lovenox 
was based, at least partially, on its unique cardiology 
indication, which no other anticoagulant in the market 
possessed and which hospitals needed to treat certain of their 
patients.  Based on Lovenox’s and Fragmin’s April 2007 
prices, Professor Elhauge determined that bundling resulted 
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in an enormous “dead zone” spanning Fragmin’s market 
share:  For any system choosing to increase its Fragmin 
market share from 10% to any amount less than 62%, it 
would actually cost hospitals more to switch from Lovenox to 
Fragmin despite Fragmin’s lower price.  Professor Elhauge 
also determined that the Program foreclosed between 68% 
and 84% of the relevant market. 
 
 On March 28, 2014, the District Court granted 
Sanofi’s motion for summary judgment.  The District Court 
held first that price was the predominant mechanism of 
exclusion under Sanofi’s practices, and therefore Eisai’s 
antitrust claims could not succeed because Sanofi’s prices 
were above cost.  Next, the court held that, even when 
analyzed under an exclusive dealing framework, Eisai’s 
claims still failed because the evidence could not support 
Eisai’s contention that Sanofi engaged in unlawful exclusive 
dealing.  Eisai also could not satisfy the antitrust-injury 
requirement because it could not establish that its lower 
market share was attributable to anticompetitive conduct by 
Sanofi as opposed to other factors.   
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
We employ “a de novo standard of review to grants of 
summary judgment, ‘applying the same standard as the 
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District Court.’”7  We “view the underlying facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion.”8  A court “shall grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”9  We review 
discovery decisions for abuse of discretion.10  
 
III. 
A. 
 The applicable law is the same for each of Eisai’s four 
claims.11  To establish an actionable antitrust violation, Eisai 
must show both that Sanofi engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct and that Eisai suffered antitrust injury as a result.12  
                                              
7 Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 
(3d Cir. 1995)).     
8 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
10 Country Floors, Inc. v. P’ship Composed of Gepner & 
Ford, 930 F.2d 1056, 1062 (3d Cir. 1991).  
11 See ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 269 
n.9, 281 (3d Cir. 2012) (analyzing claims under Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act); 
State v. N.J. Trade Waste Ass’n, 472 A.2d 1050, 1056 (N.J. 
1984) (“[T]he New Jersey Antitrust Act shall be construed in 
harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable 
federal antitrust statutes.”). 
12 See Atl. Richfeld Co. v. USA Petrol. Co., 495 U.S. 328, 
339-40 (1990); ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 269 n.9. 
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Courts employ either a per se or a rule of reason analysis to 
determine whether conduct is anticompetitive.13  The “per se 
illegality rule applies when a business practice ‘on its face, 
has no purpose except stifling competition.’”14  When 
conduct does not trigger a per se analysis, we apply a rule of 
reason test, which focuses on the “particular facts disclosed 
by the record.”15   
 
 One form of potentially anticompetitive conduct is an 
exclusive dealing arrangement, which is an express or de 
facto “agreement in which a buyer agrees to purchase certain 
goods or services only from a particular seller for a certain 
period of time.”16  While exclusive dealing arrangements may 
deprive competitors of a market for their goods, they can also 
offer consumers various economic benefits, such as assuring 
them the availability of supply and price stability.17  As such, 
an exclusive dealing arrangement does not constitute a per se 
                                              
13 W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 
85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010). 
14 Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 143 
(3d Cir. 2001)); see, e.g., N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“Among the practices which the courts 
have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves 
are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and 
tying arrangements.” (internal citations omitted)). 
15 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 
451, 467 (1992). 
16 ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 270; see LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 
F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
17 See ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 270-71. 
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violation of the antitrust laws and is instead judged under the 
rule of reason.18   
 
 Eisai argues that Sanofi’s conduct, as a whole, 
operated as a de facto exclusive dealing arrangement that 
unlawfully hindered competition.  An exclusive dealing 
agreement is illegal under the rule of reason “only if the 
‘probable effect’ of the arrangement is to substantially lessen 
competition, rather than merely disadvantage rivals.”19  While 
there is no set formula for making this determination, we 
must consider whether a plaintiff has shown substantial 
foreclosure of the market for the relevant product.20  We also 
analyze the likely or actual anticompetitive effects of the 
exclusive dealing arrangement, including whether there was 
reduced output, increased price, or reduced quality in goods 
or services.21   
                                              
18 See id. at 271.   
19 See id. (quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 
365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961)); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, 
Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005). 
20 See ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 271.  
21 See id; W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 627 F.3d at 100; see 
also Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 
F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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1. 
  To demonstrate substantial foreclosure, a plaintiff 
“must both define the relevant market and prove the degree of 
foreclosure.”22  Although “[t]he test is not total foreclosure,” 
the challenged practices must “bar a substantial number of 
rivals or severely restrict the market’s ambit.”23  “There is no 
fixed percentage at which foreclosure becomes ‘substantial’ 
and courts have varied widely in the degree of foreclosure 
they consider unlawful.”24  In analyzing the amount of 
foreclosure, our concern is not about which products a 
consumer chooses to purchase, but about which products are 
reasonably available to that consumer.25   For example, if 
customers are free to switch to a different product in the 
marketplace but choose not to do so, competition has not been 
thwarted—even if a competitor remains unable to increase its 
market share.26  One competitor’s inability to compete does 
not automatically mean competition has been foreclosed.  
 
 In certain circumstances, however, we have recognized 
that a monopolist “may use its power to break the competitive 
                                              
22 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 69 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). 
23 Dentsply, Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d at 191. 
24 ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 327 (Greenberg, J., dissenting); see 
McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 837 (11th Cir. 2015). 
25 See S.E. Mo. Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608, 616 
(8th Cir. 2011). 
26 See, e.g., Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health 
Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2010); Concord 
Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059 (8th Cir. 
2000). 
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mechanism and deprive customers of the ability to make a 
meaningful choice.”27  That was the case in LePage’s Inc. v. 
3M, where we held that the use of bundled rebates, when 
offered by a monopolist, foreclosed portions of the market to 
competitors that did not offer an equally diverse line of 
products.28  Similarly, in United States v. Dentsply 
International, Inc., we held that a dominant manufacturer of 
prefabricated teeth hindered competition when it prohibited 
dealers from adding competing tooth lines to their product 
offerings and retained the ability to terminate the dealer 
relationships at will.29  Finally, in ZF Meritor, we found the 
defendant’s conduct to be anticompetitive when the defendant 
leveraged its position as a dominant supplier of necessary 
products to force manufacturers into long term agreements 
and there was proof that the manufacturers were concerned 
that they would be unable to meet consumer demand without 
doing so.30  Although consumers had a choice between 
products in LePage’s, Dentsply, and ZF Meritor, in each case 
the defendant’s anticompetitive conduct rendered that choice 
meaningless.   
 
 Eisai argues that Sanofi’s practices substantially 
foreclosed the market for anticoagulant drugs because 
hospitals had no choice but to purchase Lovenox despite its 
increasing price.  In support, Eisai points to what it 
characterizes as “extensive evidence” of hospitals that wanted 
to purchase Fragmin but allegedly were prevented from doing 
so due to Sanofi’s conduct.  But identification of a few dozen 
                                              
27 ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 285. 
28 See 324 F.3d at 154-58. 
29 See 399 F.3d at 185. 
30 See 696 F.3d at 285. 
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hospitals out of almost 6,000 in the United States is not 
enough to demonstrate “substantial foreclosure”31 – 
particularly, if the reason a hospital did not change to 
Fragmin was due to price, i.e., the loss of the discounts 
offered by the Program.  
 
 Eisai also relies on the findings of Professor Elhauge, 
who described two purported examples of “foreclosure.”  
First, Professor Elhauge claims that the discount offered by 
Sanofi foreclosed rivals from 68% to 84% of the LMWH 
market.  Professor Elhauge calculated this percentage by 
“treat[ing] as restricted any customer that was receiving loyal 
Lovenox prices and thus would have been penalized with 
higher Lovenox prices if they purchased a higher percentage 
of their LTC drugs from rivals.”  In other words, Professor 
Elhauge assumed that all Lovenox customers utilizing the 
discount program were foreclosed from switching to another 
LMWH drug.  Second, Professor Elhauge asserts that the 
Lovenox discount created a “dead zone” that prevented 
customers from increasing their Fragmin purchases to 
anywhere between 10% and 62% of their LMWH needs.  
Again, Professor Elhauge focuses on consumer preference as 
the basis for foreclosure.  Specifically, he calculates this 
“dead zone” based on the fact that “many customers are 
                                              
31 See McWane, Inc., 783 F.3d at 837 (“Traditionally, a 
foreclosure percentage of at least 40% has been a threshold 
for liability in exclusive dealing cases.” (citing Jonathan M. 
Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer 
Harm, 70 Antitrust L.J. 311, 362 (2002)); but see id. 
(“However, some courts have found that a lesser degree of 
foreclosure is required when the defendant is a monopolist.” 
(citing Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 70)). 
17 
 
willing to switch only a portion of their Lovenox purchases to 
rival LTC drugs.”   
 
 Professor Elhauge’s examples of foreclosure 
ultimately derive from a theory of bundling of Lovenox 
demand.  But a bundling arrangement generally involves 
discounted rebates or prices for the purchase of multiple 
products.32  For example, in LePage’s, the plaintiffs alleged 
that 3M, a dominant seller of transparent tape in the United 
States, used its monopoly to gain a competitive advantage in 
the private label tape portion of the transparent market by 
offering a “multi-tiered ‘bundled rebate’ structure, which 
offered higher rebates when customers purchased products in 
                                              
32 See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 
F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Bundling is the practice of 
offering, for a single price, two or more goods or services that 
could be sold separately.”); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd., 257 F.3d 
at 270 (“[A] bundling arrangement offers discounted prices or 
rebates for the purchase of multiple products, although the 
buyer is under no obligation to purchase more than one 
item.”); Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062 (“[B]undling or 
tying . . . ‘cannot exist unless two separate product markets 
have been linked.’” (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984)); see also LePage’s, 324 
F.3d at 155 (“‘In the anticompetitive case [of package 
discounting], . . . the defendant rewards the customer for 
buying its product B rather than plaintiff’s B, not because 
defendant’s B is better or cheaper.  Rather, the customer buys 
the defendant’s B in order to receive a greater discount on A, 
which the plaintiff does not produce.’” (quoting Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 794, at 83 
(Supp. 2002))). 
18 
 
a number of 3M’s different product lines.”33  Analogizing this 
practice to tying, which is per se illegal, we found such 
bundling anticompetitive because it could “foreclose portions 
of the market to a potential competitor who does not 
manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who 
therefore cannot make a comparable offer.”34  In ZF Meritor, 
we limited the reasoning in LePage’s “to cases in which a 
single-product producer is excluded through a bundled rebate 
program offered by a producer of multiple products, which 
conditions the rebates on purchases across multiple different 
product lines.”35  Significantly, Eisai does not claim that 
                                              
33 324 F.3d at 145. 
34 See id. at 155.  “Tying” is “an agreement by a party to sell 
one product but only on the condition that the buyer also 
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that 
he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.”  
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-62 (internal quotations 
omitted); see Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 
80 (3d Cir. 2011). 
35 696 F.3d at 274 n.11.  While LePage’s remains the law of 
this Circuit, it has been the subject of much criticism.  See, 
e.g., Cascade Health Solutions, 515 F.3d at 899-903 (“Given 
the endemic nature of bundled discounts in many spheres of 
normal economic activity, we decline to endorse the Third 
Circuit’s definition of when bundled discounts constitute the 
exclusionary conduct proscribed by § 2 of the Sherman 
Act.”); LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 179 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the majority’s opinion “risks curtailing price 
competition and a method of pricing beneficial to customers 
because the bundled rebates effectively lowered [the seller’s] 
costs”); Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and 
Recommendations 94, 97 (2007), available at 
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Sanofi conditioned discounts on purchases across various 
product lines, but on different types of demand for the same 
product.  Such conduct does not present the same antitrust 
concerns as in LePage’s, and we are aware of no court that 
has credited this novel theory.  
 
 We are not inclined to extend the rationale of LePage’s 
based on the facts presented here.  Even if bundling of 
different types of demand for the same product could, in the 
abstract, foreclose competition, nothing in the record 
indicates that an equally efficient competitor was unable to 
compete with Sanofi.  Professor Elhauge defines 
incontestable demand as the “units that the customer is less 
willing to switch to rival products” because of “unique 
indications, departmental preferences, and doctor habit.”  Of 
course, obtaining an FDA indication requires investing a 
significant amount of time and resources in clinical trials.  
But Eisai does not offer evidence demonstrating that fixed 
costs were so high that competitors entering the market were 
unable to obtain a cardiology indication.  In fact, Eisai has its 
own unique cancer indication, which it presumably obtained 
because of its calculated decision to focus on that area, above 
others.  Nor does Eisai explain what percentage of 
incontestable demand for Lovenox was based on its unique 
cardiology indication as opposed to the other factors.  While 
                                                                                                     
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/a
mc_final_report.pdf (“The lack of clear standards regarding 
bundling, as reflected in LePage’s v. 3M, may discourage 
conduct that is procompetitive or competitively neutral and 
thus may actually harm consumer welfare.”); see also FTC v. 
Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 665 F.3d 1312, 1316-17 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (collecting academic criticisms of LePage’s). 
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Professor Elhauge certainly explains why, in theory, a 
customer might hesitate to switch from Lovenox to one of its 
lower priced competitors, Eisai fails to tie Professor 
Elhauge’s model to concrete examples of anticompetitive 
consequences in the record.  Accordingly, we cannot credit 
Eisai’s bundling claims, at least on the facts before us.36   
 
 Eisai’s reliance on our holdings in ZF Meritor and 
Dentsply is also misplaced.  As a preliminary matter, although 
Eisai cites extensively to these cases for the proposition that 
Lovenox customers lacked any meaningful ability to switch 
products, its supposed evidence of foreclosure is grounded in 
Professor Elhauge’s unsupported bundling theory.  Moreover, 
Sanofi’s conduct is distinguishable from the anticompetitive 
practices at issue in ZF Meritor and Dentsply.  In ZF Meritor, 
the plaintiff “introduced evidence that compliance with the 
market penetration targets was mandatory because failing to 
meet such targets would jeopardize the [customers’] 
relationships with the dominant manufacturer of 
transmissions in the market.”37  If customers did not comply 
with the targets for one year, they had to repay all contractual 
savings.38  We observed that the situation was similar to 
Dentsply, where we applied an exclusive dealing analysis 
because “the defendant threatened to refuse to continue 
dealing with customers if customers purchased rival’s 
                                              
36 Accord Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd., 257 F.3d at 264 
(“Although [the expert’s] affidavit purports to be useful in 
interpreting market facts affecting this litigation, expert 
testimony rooted in hypothetical assumptions cannot 
substitute for actual market data.”). 
37 696 F.3d at 278. 
38 Id. at 265. 
21 
 
products.”39  The threat to cut off supply ultimately provided 
customers with no choice but to continue purchasing from the 
defendants. 
 
 Here, Lovenox customers did not risk penalties or 
supply shortages for terminating the Lovenox Program or 
violating its terms.  The consequence of not obtaining the 
75% market share threshold or meeting the formulary 
requirements was not contract termination; rather, it was 
receiving the base 1% discount.  If a customer chose to 
terminate the contract entirely, it could still obtain Lovenox at 
the wholesale price.  In fact, nothing in the record 
demonstrates that a hospital’s supply of Lovenox would be 
jeopardized in any way or that discounts already paid would 
have to be refunded.  Attempting to draw a comparison with 
ZF Meritor, Eisai argues that the threat of not obtaining a 
higher discount (ranging up to 30% off) “handcuffed” 
hospitals to the Lovenox Program.  Yet, Eisai points to no 
evidence of this.  Moreover, the threat of a lost discount is a 
far cry from the anticompetitive conduct at issue in ZF 
Meritor or Dentsply.  On the record before us, Eisai has failed 
to point to evidence suggesting the kind of clear-cut harm to 
competition that was present in these earlier cases.  
Accordingly, Eisai fails to demonstrate that hospitals were 
foreclosed from purchasing competing drugs as a result of 
Sanofi’s conduct. 
2. 
 Eisai also cannot demonstrate that Sanofi’s conduct, as 
a whole, caused or was likely to cause anticompetitive effects 
in the relevant market.  Eisai claims that the District Court 
                                              
39 Id. at 278 (citing Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 189-96). 
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ignored “proof” of reduction of output, denial of consumer 
choice, and increasing price.  As to output, Eisai relies on two 
pages of Professor Elhauge’s description of the annual growth 
rate in the anticoagulant market as more than doubling after 
generic entry.  Because there was a large reduction in 
promotional spending that year, Professor Elhauge concluded 
that Sanofi must have previously been reducing output.  Such 
an assumption cannot serve as a substitute for actual evidence 
at the summary judgment stage.  Moreover, Eisai fails to 
identify any record evidence in support of its argument that 
Sanofi’s conduct restricted consumer choice, instead 
presumably relying on its theory of foreclosure.    
   
 Eisai’s sole example of actual or likely anticompetitive 
effect is that Lovenox’s price increased from 2005 until a 
generic entered the market in 2010.  According to Eisai, the 
rising price is particularly significant considering Sanofi’s 
long-term monopoly in the market and therefore provides 
ample basis for us to find a likelihood of anticompetitive 
effect.  Specifically, Sanofi had as high as a 92% share of the 
market and Lovenox’s price was the highest in the market.  
For example, in 2009, the average price per converted unit of 
Lovenox was $162.72 compared to $140.28 for Fragmin.  
While these figures certainly suggest that Lovenox’s prices 
were high, we have no reason to believe that Sanofi’s 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct was the cause.  In fact, 
Sanofi’s list prices increased at a rate similar to Eisai’s prices 
and the Pharmaceutical Producer Price Index.  As a result, we 
find little evidence to suggest that Sanofi’s practices caused 
or were likely to cause anticompetitive effects. 
 
 Without evidence of substantial foreclosure or 
anticompetitive effects, Eisai has failed to demonstrate that 
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the probable effect of Sanofi’s conduct was to substantially 
lessen competition in the relevant market, rather than to 
merely disadvantage rivals.40  Unlike in LePage’s, Dentsply, 
                                              
40 See ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 281; see also Tampa Elec., 365 
U.S. at 328-29.  Eisai’s allegations regarding the so-called 
“FUD” campaign are more properly analyzed under the law 
of deceptive marketing.  While false or deceptive statements 
may violate the antitrust laws in “rare[]” circumstances, see 
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 627 F.3d at 109 n.14; see 
also Santana Prods., Inv. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 
401 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir. 2005), at minimum, a plaintiff 
must show that such statements induced or were likely to 
induce reasonable reliance by consumers, see, e.g., Nat’l 
Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., Div. of/and Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 850 F.2d 904, 916-17 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Am. Prof’l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 
1997).  The District Court held that Eisai failed to put forth 
evidence demonstrating reliance and Eisai does not explicitly 
challenge this finding.  Eisai’s brief, in passing, provides only 
a handful of examples of hospitals that decided not to switch 
to Fragmin after their representatives attended meetings 
presented by Sanofi or its consultants.  But, even if these 
examples were enough to demonstrate reliance, Eisai has 
given us no reason to believe that it could not have corrected 
Sanofi’s misstatements by supplying the hospitals with 
accurate information.  See Santana Prods., Inv., 401 F.3d at 
133 (holding that a defendant did not violate Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act by criticizing a competitor’s partitions, in part, 
when the plaintiff “remain[ed] free to tout its products to the 
[customers] and remain[ed] equally free to reassure them that 
its partitions are superior to [defendant’s] partitions and to 
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and ZF Meritor, Lovenox customers had the ability to switch 
to competing products.  They simply chose not to do so.  We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Sanofi under a rule of reason analysis. 
 
B. 
 Turning to Safofi’s argument that its discounts 
amounted to no more than price-based competition and 
Eisai’s suit must be dismissed under the so-called price-cost 
test, we disagree.  We are not persuaded that Eisai’s claims 
fundamentally relate to pricing practices.   
 
 Unlawful predatory pricing occurs when a firm 
reduces its prices to below-cost levels to drive competitors 
out of the market and, once competition is eliminated, reduces 
output and raises its prices to supracompetitive levels.41  
Reducing prices to only above-cost levels, however, generally 
does not have an anticompetitive effect because “the 
exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost 
. . . reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged predator, 
and so represents competition on the merits.”42  While there 
may be situations where above-cost prices are 
anticompetitive, it “is beyond the practical ability of a judicial 
                                                                                                     
prove [defendant] wrong with respect to the flammability of 
[its] partitions”). 
41 See Weyerhaeuser v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318 (2007); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993); see 
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 584-85 (1986). 
42 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223.  
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tribunal” to ascertain this “without courting intolerable risks 
of chilling legitimate price-cutting.”43  In light of this 
“economic reality,” a plaintiff can succeed on a predatory 
pricing claim only if it can show that (1) the rival’s low prices 
are below an appropriate measure of its costs and (2) the rival 
had a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in 
below-cost prices.44  This is known as the price-cost test. 
 
 When a competitor complains that a rival’s sales 
program violates the antitrust laws, we must consider whether 
the conduct constitutes an exclusive dealing arrangement or 
simply a pricing practice.  Defendants may argue that the 
challenged conduct is fundamentally an above-cost pricing 
scheme and therefore the price-cost test applies, ultimately 
dooming a plaintiff’s claims.  But not all contractual practices 
involving above-cost prices are per se legal under the antitrust 
laws.45  We previously explained in ZF Meritor that the price-
cost test may be utilized as a “specific application of the ‘rule 
of reason’” only when “price is the clearly predominant 
mechanism of exclusion.”46  There, the defendant urged us to 
apply the price-cost test because the plaintiff’s claims were, 
“at their core, no more than objections to . . . offering prices . 
. . through its rebate program.”47  We declined to adopt this 
“unduly narrow characterization of the case as a ‘pricing 
practices’ case.”48  We explained that price itself did not 
                                              
43 Id. 
44 Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 318; see also Brooke Grp., 509 
U.S. at 222-24. 
45 ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 278. 
46 Id. at 273, 275.   
47 Id. at 273. 
48 Id. at 269. 
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function as the exclusionary tool:  “Where, as here, a 
dominant supplier enters into de facto exclusive dealing 
arrangements with every customer in the market, other firms 
may be driven out not because they cannot compete on a price 
basis, but because they are never given an opportunity to 
compete, despite their ability to offer products with 
significant customer demand.”49   
 
 Under ZF Meritor, when pricing predominates over 
other means of exclusivity, the price-cost test applies.  This is 
usually the case when a firm uses a single-product loyalty 
discount or rebate to compete with similar products.50  In that 
situation, an equally efficient competitor can match the 
loyalty price and the firms can compete on the merits.  More 
in-depth factual analysis is unnecessary because we know that 
“the balance always tips in favor of allowing above-cost 
pricing practices to stand.”51  As a result, we apply the price-
cost test as an application of the rule of reason in those 
circumstances and conclude that the above-cost pricing at 
issue is per se legal.  But our conclusion may be different 
under different factual circumstances.  Here, for example, 
                                              
49 Id. at 281.  
50 See, e.g., NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 452 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc); Concord Boat Corp., 207 F.3d at 1061-
63; Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 
236 (1st Cir. 1983).   
51 ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 273; see Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 
223; see also ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 275 (“[W]hen price is 
the clearly predominant mechanism of exclusion . . .  so long 
as the price is above-cost, the procompetitive justifications 
for, and the benefits of, lowering prices far outweigh any 
potential anticompetitive effects.”). 
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Eisai alleges that its rival, having obtained a unique FDA 
indication, offered a discount that bundled incontestable and 
contestable demand.  On Eisai’s telling, the bundling – not 
the price – served as the primary exclusionary tool.  Because 
we have concluded that Eisai’s claims are not substantiated 
and that they fail a rule of reason analysis, we will not opine 
on when, if ever, the price-cost test applies to this type of 
claim. 
 
IV. 
 Eisai also argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in holding that discovery of deposition transcripts 
from the OSS litigation was irrelevant and unduly 
burdensome.  Assuming the transcripts were relevant, Eisai 
must still show that the order resulted in “actual and 
substantial prejudice.”52  Eisai cannot show prejudice when it 
appears to have engaged in ample discovery in this case:  
Sanofi claims that Eisai took over thirty depositions, received 
millions of pages of documents, and subpoenaed 
approximately 350 third parties.  Eisai was free to elicit 
information regarding the OSS litigation during this extensive 
discovery process and—in fact—did so by deposing at least 
one witness from that litigation.  We therefore conclude that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Eisai’s request for production of the 2003 OSS deposition 
transcripts.   
 
V. 
                                              
52 See Cyberwold Enter. Tech., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 
189, 200 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order, granting summary judgment in favor of Sanofi, 
and its order denying Eisai’s motion to compel discovery of 
transcripts from a prior litigation. 
